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SIEGFRIED PAUSEWANG

WHO IS THE PEASANT?

Experience with rural development in Zambia

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WHO IS THE PEASANT?
Experience with rural development in Zambia

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Summary:

Women in rural Zambia are responsible for subsistence agriculture to feed their families, while men practice agriculture for the market. To expand market production, planners and aid donors support the so-called "emergent farmers".
President Kaunda recently terminated IMF-cooperation and introduced an alternative economic recovery programme aiming at more growth with equity. The paper argues that it should primarily support rural women, to create growth where it benefits the majority of the rural poor.

Sammendrag:

Zambiske kvinner driver selvforsyningsbruk for å ernære familiene, mens menn driver salgsjordbruk. Planleggere og uhjelpsorganisasjoner støtter de såkalte "emergent farmers" for å øke salgsproduksjonen.
President Kaunda sa nylig opp samarbeidet med IMF og proklamerte et alternativt program for økonomisk gjenreising. Artikkelen argumenterer for at programmet primært skulle gi støtte til kvinnene i landbruket, for å generere vekst der den direkte kommer den fattige majoriteten på landsbygda tilgode.

Indexing terms:

Zambia

Women

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Siegfried Pausewang

WHO IS THE PEASANT?

Experience with rural development in Zambia

A few months ago Zambia terminated its cooperation with the International Monetary Funds, IMF, and started a new economic experiment to get the economy moving again. The new policy, announced by President Kenneth Kaunda in his speach on the First of May, was introduced as a programme for growth on the basis of own resources, enforcing thrift, but acknowledging the need to protect the poor and weak in the society. It intends, in short, to restructure the national economy so that it can produce what the population consumes, and asks people to consume only what they can produce. It relies in essential parts on the ability of agriculture to increase production through the efforts of the majority of small farmers.

The experience hitherto in Zambia with respect to support to small farmers and peasant agriculture is not encouraging. We will have to take a look into social conditions in rural Zambia to understand the chances for success of a new drive in agricultural policy. But before that, we will have to recall the historical context for agricultural policies in Zambia, and the reasons for breaking with the IMF.

Historical roots

After a century of turmoil in the Southern African region, when the expansion of the Zulu state drove other tribes from their home areas and instigated tribal wars, conquests, and new state formations, the area came successively under the influence of South African business and mining interests. The territory of Northern Rhodesia came from the end of 19th century under the control of the British South Africa Company, through "coercive diplomacy" and a series of treaties with local leaders. In some cases, local elites strengthened their positions through such contracts and collaboration with the British. Through a contract with the Barotse in the West, BASC claimed to have gained control over an area which later got economic importance as the Copperbelt. In return, the Barotse were given a special status in the territory.

Mining was not very profitable to begin with, in contrast to Southern Rhodesia and the Johannesburg area, where labour supply became inadequate. In practice, the area was administered as a company colony, mainly as a hinterland supplying cheap labour.

To break the resistance of African men against wage labour in the mines, the company used special tax laws and harsh sanctions. Land was confiscated and other income opportunities suppressed, as was subsistence agriculture. In the most accessible regions, particularly along the railway line to the Copperbelt, the best land was reserved for white settlers, while the African families were resettled in reservates on less fertile land. Local leaders were given privileges against collaboration in recruiting large numbers of migrant labourers. To pay their taxes, men had to spend long periods of their lives away from their families in the mines in the South.

Subsistence agriculture was left to the women to feed themselves and their children. To cope with work, they had to simplify operations. Nothing was done to help them use even simple technical innovations to make agriculture more efficient. The hoe remained the main tool in "chitamene" slash-and-burn agriculture; but periods of fallow were shortened and the land used for too many years successively, because men were not present to cut the bush and clear new fields. Agricultural land was over-exploited and depleted. An empowerishment of the area resulted, which was increased during the first world war, when over 270 000 men were forced to enlist in the British army.

In 1923 Great Britain took over the territory as a colony. About at the same time, large copper deposits were discovered, and with the increased demand on the world market, new mining companies came to establish mines in the Copperbelt. A first boom was interrupted by the recession, but with the armament industries in the 1930es, a new boom started which continued during the second world war. Migrant labour was now recruited for the Copperbelt, migration to the South was reduced, but conditions for the African workers and their families were not much different. Wages were low, remittances to the families residing in rural areas minimal, and men had still to live away for long periods during most of their working life[1].

After independence

After 1950 a new boom brought new expansion, and when Zambia became an independent state in 1964, copper production gave the new country a considerable wealth, and constituted 92% of the export income and 42% of GDP. But dependence on foreign capital and technology was very strong. The country had a very weak base in agriculture, as well as in other economic activities.

The new independent government used the income from copper sales for a vigorous expansion in social services - such as schools, health services, social security schemes and labour security - but also to build up infrastructure and new industries. Given the structure of the Zambian economy, it was natural that mainly import-substituting industries were built up, and that they were dependent on imported raw materials and half-finished products, and on foreign capital and expertise. Agricultural expansion was initially considered almost only in terms of highly mechanized and technically advanced farms. Agricultural research and extension services were built up, but in practice served only the needs of commercial farming, and mostly gave service to the big farms. Some politicians even discouraged subsistence and small scale agriculture, arguing that the country could afford to feed the population by producing food on mechanised farms with less toil, or importing what was needed[2].

Considerable progress was made in the field of social services, particularly in the expansion of the school system and health services. Those who had a job, enjoyed substantial rights of social security, job protection, and "fringe benefits" such as company housing or housing allowances, transport allowances, subsidized food prices etc. But at the same time, social differences increased, and the gap between urban and rural standards widened. Urbanisation

accelerated, making Zambia the most urbanized country in Black Africa[3].

When the oil crisis in 1973 reduced Zambias wealth, and the fall in copper prices on the world market in 1975 crippled foreign exchange incomes, the financial basis for this system was quickly eroded. In the expectation that copper prices would soon rise again, Zambia resorted to loans, which were willingly offered from international banks wanting to place petro-dollars.

After 1975, cuts in government spending became necessary, which hit building industries worst, but affected also agriculture critically. Lack of foreign exchange made imports increasingly difficult, and many industries were running into problems and worked on reduced capacities because they could not get spare parts and essential inputs in time. Shortages of spareparts also became a serious problem for mechanized agriculture and for industries refining agricultural products[4].

Agricultural policies and the subsistence farmers

About at the same time, from 1975 onwards, interest in the small farmer increased in the Ministry of Agriculture. The Third National Development Plan, 1979 - 1983, recognized that agriculture would have to replace mining as the leading sector of the economy, and emphasized the necessity to develop also the majority of subsistance and small farmers who, after all, produced more than half of the food supplies for the country. Initial measures were little effective, but from about 1980, when the "Adaptive Research Team" started operating, support to small farmers received gradually increasing emphasis.

Practice in agricultural policies in Zambia was often characterized by a pattern of one-shot planning efforts, or "hit-and-run" measures resembling the cockoos progeniture: after dropping an egg in some other bird's nest leaving it to others to feed up the offspring or not. A campaign was announced with great publicity and boundless expectations, and started with considerable expenditure. But enthusiasm was soon allowed to fade, and when success appeared below expectations, the project was dropped - though never discontinued, as nobody wanted to take responsibility for winding up the hopes of yesterday. Many ruins continue a shadowy existence and create costs without effect. An example in point are the Farmer Training Centers which were built with foreign aid, mainly from the World Bank, in the late sixties. After they were handed over to the Government for operation, emphasis quickly turned on other projects, and budget cuts in consequence of the economic crisis made them obsolete. Yet they continued to exist, fully staffed, while their budget allowed them to run just two courses yearly for a week each. Other examples are the Rural Reconstructionon Centers (plowing service stations), the National Service campaign and their camps, the "back to the land" campaign, the settlement schemes, a failed attempt to form producer cooperatives, the functional literacy programme, the Production Units in schols, the Operation Food Production and its plan to form sixteen huge State farms, and an attempt in 1983 to revive the Rural Reconstruction Centers as "rural

resource centers". Some more lasting effect had only some programmes which engaged foreign donours in operation of rural development programmes, such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme in different regions, and the Adaptive Research Team.

The IMF package

Copper prices only continued to fall, and Zambia accumulated debts, adding a growing debt crisis to the market problems. As condition for further loans, the International Monetary Fund insisted on a restructuring of the economy, and a World Bank / IMF package programme was presented and reluctantly, bit by bit, introduced by the Zambian Government. Essentially, it prescribed to adjust to the changed economic situation through thrift, work, export, and reduced consumption. It demanded to cut back public spending, especially subsidies, to reduce the government budget deficit, and to introduce a credit ceiling to cut money supply, to impose a ceiling on wage rises, to decontrol prices and interest rates, and to increase the efficiency in the civil service, reducing its employment, to increase exports and stimulate productive investments especially for export purposes, while discouraging consumption. Devaluation of the Kwacha was to stimulate export and discourage import, and an auction system was to adjust the exchange rate to economic conditions.

For agriculture, this programme brought more emphasis on market production and especially on export products. While the Ministry of Agriculture as well as some donours continued to support small farmers and to direct aid to the rural poor, the World Bank started a large lending programme, as part of an "agricultural rehabilitation programme", to support commercial agriculture, aimed at increasing food and export crop production. In our Country Study in 1985, Hans Hedlund characterized the World Bank programme as follows: "The bank anticipates that large-scale commercial farming should concentrate on products with obvious comparative advantages like oil seeds, wheat, dairy, and tobacco. In fact, the most profitable crops are likely to be those produced by large-scale farmers, to the disadvantage of small-scale and emergent farmers facing less profitable prices and marketing constraints. The World Bank seems to favour a high technology approach and considers tractorization necessary. Tractorization is one of the more important projects suggested by the Bank as fast disbursing projects, leaving most of the small households outside the rehabilitation programme"[5]. Hedlund further comments that "...it seems that the administrative and financial structure of the agricultural sector in Zambia not only will be dramatically changed but also completely dependent on World Bank finance and policy interventions"[6].

In October 1985 the auctioning system was introduced, as the last major measure meeting IMF conditions, and Zambia received new loans[7]. The value of the Kwacha fell immediately to one third of its previous value in dollars, and after a shortlived recovery continued to fluctuate with clear downward trend. Inflation trebled, the consumer price index made a jump, and living conditions, especially for the poorer sections of the population, deteriorated quickly.

Agriculture felt immediately the increase of prices for fertilizers, seeds and other inputs, while price incentives were much slower and less pronounced. The prospect or reduced and successively abolished subsidies on food did not make a good climate for price incentives through competition in trade of agricultural goods, and the lack of infrastructure continued to limit the possibilities to provide access to the market for peasants and small farmers.

The intention of the World Bank programme was to offer peasants a minimum price through State or parastatal marketing systems, while private traders were supposed to offer higher prices wherever possible, within a competitive marketing structure. In practice however the lack of infrastructure made it impossible for the farmer to realize price advantages, except for the few largest farms who were equipped and could afford to reach the best markets with their deliveries. Smaller and emergent farmers remained dependent on the unreliable, slow, insufficiently equipped and inefficient official marketing system, squeezed between rising costs for inputs and stagnating farmgate prices.

The "Basic Needs" approach

As early as 1980, the Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa of the International Labour Organisation senta "basic needs mission" to Zambia, upon invitation from the Government. Their report, published under the title "Zambia. Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure"[8], can be considered an alternative development model to the World Bank concept. The ILO/JASDPA report too recognizes that, due to the severe and continuing crisis, Zambias economy can no longer support the social services and benefits established in better years. Nor meet the basic needs requirements of the population, ILO/JASPA adds. In the "Summary and recommendations", the report designs a programme for reconstructuring the Zambian economy so that it can produce what the population needs. To combine production increase with concern for distribution, it recommends to narrow the gaps between rich and poor, by mobilizing the weak and underprivileged groups, especially the rural poor, for development from below. Growth with equity is interpreted to mean productive growth where it is needed most fundamentally, to satisfy human needs, not necessarily where it pays. Thus ILO/JASPA, in detailed recomendations, designed a programme of production increase starting from the bottom, a programme of "basic needs first".

The new economic recovery programme of 1987

However, the Zambian government remained tied to the World Bank programme of economic recovery, through IMF conditionality for loans and donor pressure, and also through internal interests. When, at the end of 1986, the Government abolished subsidies on breakfast meal, the more expensive variety of maize meal, and prices of this staple food for the higher income groups doubled over night, riots arose on the Copperbelt. The Government quickly re-introduced the subsidies, before riots spread to the Capital. Discontent was nevertheless growing, and early in 1987, the auctioning system was suspended, to re-gain control over exchange rates and inflation. The

break with the IMF loan conditions came in April, and in his May speech, President Kaunda announced the Government's alternative economc programme.

Kaunda said that Zambia had consented to put the IMFs programme into practice "in the hope that the country's economic performance would improve and the drastic fall in the people's standard of living would be arrested"[9]. But after four years of experimenting, he said, income per capita had fallen from 630 USD in 1981 to less than 200 USD in 1987. Escalating unemployment threatened to become a permanent feature in Zambias economy, and a galloping inflation was pushing prices of basic goods up far beyond the reach of most people, and especially the poor majority. Malnutrition was increasing, and mortality, especially among infants, was rising, and unrest was threatening to undermine the peace and unity of the nation. "This situation cannot and will not be allowed to continue. It is patently clear that far from improving our condition, we are not succeeding; hence the need for a fresh look."[10] Zambia has to free herself from the "dependency syndrome" and master her own fate, he said. A new drive would set new and realistic goals, and implement them with conviction, discipline, and dedication.

He so outlined a programme of "growth from our own resources". the new strategy for economic development was to ensure austerity while recognizing the need to protect the poor and vulnerable members of the society. This asked for a change in consumption patterns, "to consume only what we produce while using the scarce foreign exchange to import inputs and machinery for agriculture and industries producing essential goods for export"[11].

The measures announced can be summarized as follows: Debt servicing will be limited to a maximum of 10 % of net export earnings. The auctioning system will be replaced by a controlled exchange rate, to halt fluctuations, secure financial stability, and control inflation. Maximum prices will be fixed by the Prices and Incomes Commission. Tax privileges for foreign staff will be reduced and controlled more thoroughly. Industrial productivity is to be improved through concentrating efforts in the most essential branches producing necessary goods, basic consumption essentials, and export products. Imports will be limited to the most important inputs for agriculture and industries with priority, and consumption essentials. Efforts to diversify exports will support untraditional export products and processed goods. Small industries and small farmers will get support through a new revolving fund within the Bank of Zambia. A new and more equal tax system will be designed to stimulate the economy, to encourage productive use of property and discourage rentistic and speculative ventures. An improved revenue system will make capital- and import-intensive production unattractive. A series of measures to stimulate employment, through public works and stimulation of investment in the districts, will be suplemented through realistic wage policies and fixed minimum wages. A special programme of decentralized investment, primarily in small projects bringing quick results, is planned to stimulate confidence in decentralized economic activity and private initiatives in the districts. The State will review the wages of civil servants, to avoid further loss of qualified personnel to private industries paying

better wages. Zambia assures donours that the measures announced are not intended to offend them, and will continue to appeal for foreign aid to support the economic recovery programme.

Soicial and economic conditions in Zambian agriculture

Among European experts, as late as around 1982, commercial agriculture in Zambia was considered a goldmine. Initial investments were considerable, but could with some luck and good weather be repaid within two seasons, the income thereafter being lavish. Most likely, this is still true, though the increase in costs of inputs has certainly limited earning capacities. However, such prospering presupposes that the investor has control over all strategic factors. He must have enough machinery for all operations, including reserves, and be able to reach the market directly with his own transport. He must have direct access to foreign currency, i.e. an account abroad, to be able to telegraphically order a sparepart by air cargo, and the technical capacity to repair own machinery. Wear and tear on machinery is higher than often expected, and repairs time-consuming. Many optimists have suffered damaging losses when getting stuck in the middle of a busy harvesting season with a machine breaking down and an essential sparepart not being available locally. Many Zambians have been thrown out of their attempts to establish themselves in commercial agriculture, believing that they could afford to buy tractors and machines, but not considering in advance the damaging effects of a breakdown in the worst moment.

There is, therefore, a big gap between highly profitable large-scale operation of mechanized commercial farms, and small scale farming, offering a family a living, but not more. Existing statistics partly blur this gap[12], which is clearly observable in rural Zambia.

The small farm sector still produces over 50 % of the food crops consumed in Zambia, and if informal markets are included, even of the marketed food crops. The majority of small farmers produces mainly in a traditional way, with simple hand tools. The hoe is still, as before colonial times, the main agricultural tool for the majority of them. Only in small areas along the line of rail, a minority of African peasants learned from Buer settlers the use of ox plows, and a few of them managed to establish commercial farms. Adaptation of European techniques such as plow agriculture were not encouraged, since the colonial administration prefered to have the men available as migrant labourers, while African agriculture was intended to be a marginal occupation, mainly run by women, so the miners' families would not depend on their wages. Nobody thought of teaching women to use the plow.

Small scale agriculture continued from where it was before labour migration: Men changed their main responsibility for hunting and occasionally clearing the bush for the women's small garden plots into the responsibility to earn the money needed to meet their tax obligation. Women had to expand their small garden plots and develop more systematic agriculture, to feed their families without the men's contribution. African men who attempted to grow agricultural products for sale, were considered an unwanted

competition for the white farmers who settled along the Line of Rail to produce maize on large scale as cheap food for the workers[13].

This pattern was preserved and stabilized in Zambia until well into the period after independence, and it is no coincidence that policies encouraging small scale farming were planned only around 1975,[14] when mining ceazed to offer employment and men started to return to the villages. From this time, a group of small scale farmers producing mostly cash crops, and learning from commercial farmers to use fertilizers and improved seeds, has grown considerably. This group is usually termed "emergent farmers" and statistically grouped as those cultivating one to ten hectares and earning a yearly income in a range between 100 and 3000 Kwacha from sales of agricultural produce[15]. The smallest of them may in fact earn less than the wealthier group of the "subsistence peasants", the main difference being that the latter operate mainly to sustain a family, and sell only very little agricultural crop which is produced in excess of consumption needs, or when purchases for family consumption demand income. Subsistence peasant families need some money for purchasing salt, oil, clothes, shoes, transport, milling services etc., but mostly get money income from non-farm activities, like occasional labour or other services, beer brewing, homecraft, or collecting fruits or larvae, etc[16].

Division of labour in the family

Before looking into problems of rural social strata, we have to consider a particular aspect of family structure in Zambia which has a bearing on agricultural policies. From the times of mining expansion, when labour migration was enforced through taxes to be paid in cash, a new pattern of division of labour within the rural family developed. Men assumed responsibility for earning money, and for the money economy of the family, while women were left alone with the responsibility for the home, for the upkeep of the family, and for agricultural work to feed the family. As there was comparatively little agricultural work practiced before, men shifted directly over from hunting to labour migration, while women had to expand their gardening work to make ends meet, as they lost any contributions from the hunting efforts of men. A rather rigid division of labour also within agricultural operations developed or was reenforced. Particularly hoeing and weeding was women's work, considered degrading for a man. But the cutting of branches and clearing of bush was still a man's work, and difficulties to get men for such work contributed to the overexploitation and consequent degradation of agricultural land on the female-operated plots in chitamene shifting cultivation.

Returning men continued the acquired patterns at home, assuming responsibility for the money economy of the family. They naturally claimed the right to decide on sales as well as money expenditures. Wherever crop production was practiced for sale, agriculture became a man's job. On commercial plots, men could even do some of the women's work. Patterns vary in different areas, but in most places, weeding remained a typical work for females. Weeding is a time consuming job, and the operation which usually limits the size of a plot a family can manage to till.

However, the man, as the head of the household, maintains his traditional rights on the wife's labour. A wife who can do the weeding is an important asset for commercial crop production. Men require their wives to work on their commercial fields, even if this work competes with work on her plot for family consumption. It has thus been observed in different areas in Zambia that an increase in production of cash crops is accompanied with a decline in nutrition standards, especially for small children[17].

It apprers a general trend that division of labour became established along the line of cash crop production versus subsistence - even where both continued to grow the same crops. I believe that this is, most likely, the main reason for the surprising observation that "subsistence households" sell very little of excess crops, and prefer to meet their cash needs by selling other services or products of typical female activities outside the farm, like collecting fruits and larvae or brewing beer[18]. Women are constantly overworked, and their working time is limiting their agricultural output. Yet, it may be better for them to spend some time for such an activity because they can easier control an income from a typical female work.

This division of labour has its correspondence in consumption patterns. Several observers have described that consumption preferences of men differ from those of women who spend their income on the physical needs of the family. A man is much more likely to give priority to a transistor radio, or watch or other prestige objects, or to spend money on beer or on other women. As the household is not his business, a man sees little reason to spend his money on helping his wife with the maintenance of the family[19].

An interest conflict which grew out of a historical economic development can thus be observed to extend into the family, dividing it into different households. While several surveys show that women do considerably more of agricultural work than men, they also reveal that "household incomes from general commercial crops like maize, cotton etc. are largely channeled to the males, regardless of the labour input of the wome. Few spouses share a common household budget."[20] The Norwegian Country Study characterized this development as "...a class differentiation within the village and, even more significantly, within the rural family. Lower class men established an economic position separated from that of their wives, and to a considerable degree achieved at their expense. A conflict of interest was introduced into the family, divided as it was into two complementary economic units related to different positions in social stratification. Class conflict became a characteristic built into the rural family, where the control over female labour determined a man's chances to increase his wealth, be it as rural producer or as migrant; while such work limited the woman's chances to improve her own and her children's household economy."[21]

Rural social stratification

A division of Zambian agriculture into the three categories: Commercial farmers - emergent farmers - subsistence peasants represents both different origin, technical standards and capital requirements, differences in interests, mode of production and consumption patterns, and even ethnic and sex differentials, not to speak of different consciousness and ideological justification for own privileges. In Marx' terms, we find an example of a class "an sich", in the sense that all the typical characteristics of a class division can be found, but the consciousness of antagonism is lacking. Both men and women, though realizing a conflict in concrete issues of everyday life, do not conceive of it as an antagonism, but experience daily clashes as unfortunate disturbances in a principally and normatively harmoneous relationship. Different life conditions and behavioural norms for men and women are not questioned in principle, but accepted as natural.

Also the State, with its apparatus of services and administrative regulations, accepts the fiction of the family as social and economic unit. Services and training concerning money and income generating activities are provided to men, while women are offered training in housekeeping and child care[22].

The Central Statistical Office uses four categories: Large scale commercial farms, medium commercial, emergent farmers and subsistence peasants. Because figures are available on these categories, most authors follow them, instead of analyzing essential differences in interests and class relations. Consciously or not, the CSO contributes to obscuring essential differences through its categorization.

In contrast, the Third National Development Plan (1979-83) divides rural producers into the three categories Commercial - Emergent-Subsistence. However, it subdivides the emergent farmers into three categories: middle sized emergent farmers, organized small-scale farmers, and improved village farmers. The latter are those who are just starting to engage in market crop production. They are considered the group on which a development programme has to concentrate, to change the agricultural structure[23]. The idea is to convert more and more of Zambias peasants into "emergent farmers"- with the assumption that they should engage in market production in addition to cultivation of food crops for their own consumption. Such a strategy intends to achieve an increase of production from the lower end. It is understood as production-oriented support to the poor, as growth with equity.

Nobody has ever asked, as far as I can see, who, in practice, are the emergent farmers on whom economists put their hopes: Are they those who took the first step in a desired direction, towards more production and better standards of living? Are they really representing the step to supplement subsistence with market integration? Or are they, indeed, just those men who demand their wives to provide free labour on their commercial fields, even if their children go hungry and suffer of malnutrition, because they do not see the connection, but take advantage of those privileges and chances which society offers them? The conflict which lies in-built in having two modes of production within one family, is totally overlooked. Hence, programmes of expanding cash crop production

of emergent farmers just follow the tradition of offering men incentives to produce for the market, not helping women to feed their families.

So far, donors have been following the logic of these Zambian plans with their development aid. Can we thus conclude that aid for rural development to Zambia is given, to a considerable degree, for programmes which develop market production at the expense of the wellbeing of rural women and children? And if so: what could be done to avoid such effects? Can aid which is concerned about the distributive effects of development demand different plans? Can aid to the poorest sectors of the rural population, who will be found among the (female) subsistence peasants and not the (male) cashcrop producing emergent farmers, be channeled to them within existing patterns of rural services and development plans? Does the new policy of national self-reliance offer better chances of realizing aid to the poorest sections than the World Bank concept of increasing mechanized food production for the market?

The Norwegian country study concluded, as one of its main recommendations, that Norway should reorient its "Village Agriculture Programme" (VAP) in Northern province into a "Women Agriculture Programme" (WAP). Thereby it was hoped to re-unite Norways concern both for productive investment and for poverty-oriented aid. Production increases are necessary to solve Zambias problems, the study argued. They have to be stimulated where they are needed mostly, where more production is directly converted into more wellbeing, better nutrition, less poverty: with rural women. Programmes of training, services offering inputs, credits and organisational help should be directed towards women, offering them an alternative to government services which already are available for men, instead of giving men yet another service. This was suggested to be done within the existing structure, supplementing, not replacing existing services with services specifically reaching women[24]. Yet, the suggestion was quickly put aside and forgotten, both by Zambian and Norwegian administrators, who feared men might protest, or resented 'yet another separate project for women' instead of integration.

More questions than answers

In conclusion one can not just recommend a programme to support women directly. The attempt clearly raises more questions than it answers. If women are helped to some excess produce to sell on the market, which consequences will this have within the family? Will it create new conflicts within local society? Will it offer a more independent position for women, or will husbands sell the produce or demand control over the money? Would society tolerate a project creating more independent women?

The norwegian "Country Study" recommended a special studyh to operationalize possibilities to mobilize women for participation in a "Women Agriculture Programme" and analyze its possible effects[25]. We do not know much about the likely consequences of suc a programme. We are not even in a position to give more than guesses about what consequences a support programme for the "emergent

farmers" would have for the family. Could such a programme be a way to bring men back into their roles as family fathers and bread winners (from which they were alienated through mine work and labour migration)? Or would it give rise to a new stratum of future 'kulaks' exploiting the labour of others for commercial agriculture?

What we can say is that there is a need for more cross-disciplinary research on all these questions. Irrrespective of which development policies are chosen, it will be important to know more about how women operate within the social system, which social forces keep them in their place, and where they can find openings for change. The consequences for other social groups of measures taken and changes achieved need to be better understood. It must appear useful to predict which measures will provoke resistance in local circles or in the political setup. Further research can identify areas where practical innovations, possibly intermediate technology, can help to free women from some of the most time consuming and tiring everyday jobs, to give them more time for efforts to increase their productivity, as well as for participation in planning for their own benefit. Anthropological studies should attempt to predict which cultural patterns and forces might resist change to the advantage of women, whether women who get involved might become ostracized or kept back through jealousy or by the omnipresent fear of witchcraft and magic practices. It should be possible also to anticipate which religious groups would resist women activities, and whether religious sanctions might create problems for enthusiastic and active women. All these questions need to be answered, to create an adequate consciousness, and to find ways which open possibilities for the women themselves to take their development into their own hands. And possibilities for aid agencies to support actively such attempts.

The new economic programme

In his speach on First of May, President Kaunda hardly touched on agriculture, except giving priority in the use of scarce foreign exchange to agricultural spareparts and investments in the districts. Kaunda's vision of an alternative plrogramme of recovery is clearly inspired by more consideration for the poor, and thus closer to the "basic needs" approach of ILO.

Unfortunately, the measures he announced so far appear not to offer good prospects for achieving an economic recovery. A new drive in a hopelessly run-down economy demands much mmore radical measures.

Zambia has, in reality, very small chances to make a breakthrough through exports, given the international economic climate. Markets for agricultural produce are unelastic and heavily protected. Besides, many countries are in the same situation as Zambia, and try to expand exports. Larger quantities might achieve a price fall, at best leaving exporters with no higher incomes from their increased production.

Moreover, growth with equity requires internal redistribution. In a contracted economy, one cannot take better care of the poor without sacrifices by the better-off. To sdome degree, such redistribu-

tion needs to be shielded against influences from outside. The problem is demonstrated by Kaunda's reference to the salaries of civil servants. Offering higher wages to already privileged people to keep them in Government offices, will again increase inequality. Zambia cannot afford both to subsidize the weak and to give the strong competitive wages, having no control whatsoever over wage levels dependent on competition in industrialized countries. Zambia cannot afford both social services and an unrestricted liberal economy in international competition. The IMF programme tried to cut down subsidies and social services to make the economy competitive. The new programme attempts again to have both.

An alternative economic programme with chances of success has also to strengthen exports, but they must remain additional, on top of self-reliance. First priority must be given to production to satisfy the needs of all. Kaunda's idea of changed consumption patterns offer a key to such policies. Basically, Zambians must learn to consume what they can produce themselves, and to produce what they want to consume. But at the same time, those who have the capacity to work, have to work also for those who have none - the children, the aged and sick, who also need food. People must learn again that social services have a cost, to which they have to contribute. If one wants schools, free health services, transport facilities, pension schemes and subsidized food, one has to work for it. Social services are consumption too, it is not enough to demand them, someone has to produce the resources to be distributed. For too long, copper incomes have made too many Zambians believe the State would take care of them. Privileges have been accepted as self-evident rights. An internal redistribution will necessarily meet resistance from those who stand in danger of loosing privileges and resources. It may be questioned whether Zambia can mobilize the necessary political support and strength for such a programme.

So far, the new programme says little about policies in rural development. However, there is some hope that agriculture may get a better chance to work towards "growth with equity" and to stimulate production increases "from below", once the pressure towards large-scale commercial production or food crops is eased. It may in the end remain a question for political decision, whether Zambia should attempt a re-integration of the rural family, or whether policies should accept a basic antagonism and support women in their struggle to win more rights and inforce a change of social relations within their society.

In any case, support to the poorest groups is interference in power relations as well as economic relations. A redistribution not only of resources, but also of work, and of rights, is part and parcel of poverty-oriented rural development in Zambia. It is important to know exactly who at present enjoys which privileges, controls which resources, claims which rights. And who feeds whom and works for whom. In the first place, we should not allow ourselves to avoid the question who, actually, is the subsistence peasant whose "development from below" could provide an alternative to large-scale mechanized commercial agriculture.

Bergen, 25/8-1987

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See also Ben Turok (ed.): Development in Zambia, London 1981

2 for example, rice production in the Zambezi flood plains in Western Province was virtually abandoned, according to reports of local elders, when politicians in the first election campaigns told people to stop toiling like slaves: We are now our own masters and can provide rice bought from other countries.

3 Zambia. Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, page 6 - 8.

4 An example provides the pineapple cannery established with foreign aid in Mwinilunga, to give a remote district some basis for economic growth. After many farmers, both large commercial farmers and small producers, had been persuaded to grow pineapples, the factory ran into increasing problems. Shortages of cans, or of lids, or of transport to collect fruit or to transport the ready product to the Center, or of finance to pay the producers, occured in ever shorter intervals, until farmers left their pineapples unharvested, to rot on the root, and the cannery stopped operations completely.

5 Zambia. Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, p. 84.

6 Zambia. Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, p. 82.

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8 International Labour Office, Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa: Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure. Findings and Recommendations of an ILO/JASPA Basic Needs Mission to Zambia, Addis Ababa 1981. See also the earlier ILO/JASAPA report: Narrowing the Gaps. Planning for Basic Needs and Productive Employment in Zambia. Report to the Government of Zambia by a JASPA Employment Advisory Mission. Addis Ababa 1977.
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12 Most authors follow the practice of Central Statistical Office, which includes a category of "medium commercial farmers". See f.ex. SIDA: The Zambian Food and Agricultural Sector. Rural Development Studies 22. Uppsala 1987, p. 9, and Howard Simson: Zambia. A Country Study, Uppsala 1985, p. 40. See also Zambia. Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, p. 75.
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19 Dorothy Muntemba: Women in Agriculture, Lusaka 1986 (mimeo), Adrian Wood: State and Agriculture in Zambia, II: The Context and Consequences of Recent Reforms in Agricultural Policy, Addis Ababa 1984 (mimeo); Bonnie Keller: The Integration of Zambian Women in Development. Lusaka (NORAD) 1984 (71 p.).

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